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It was 1949 when lawyer-wife Katharine Hepburn upstaged
lawyer-husband Spencer Tracy before admiring fans. In the
nearly forty years since, much has changed for female lawyers;
any comparison between Adam's Rib and L.A. Law will show just
how much. As women continue to enter the bar in large numbers,
law firms themselves continue to change. Although female law-
yers often do well for themselves, discrimination in many places
persists.' This is also true for ethnic and racial minorities. While
many minorities have joined the bar, discrimination continues.2 In
* Graduate student in the Department of Economics, University of California,
Los Angeles.
** Assistant Professor of Business Economics, University of California, Los
Angeles, and Lecturer at the School of Management, National University of
Singapore.
*** Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
The authors thank Dean Susan Westerberg Prager, Associate Dean Carole
Goldberg-Ambrose, and Assistant Deans Susan Gillig and Barbara Varat of the
UCLA School of Law for their support; John Wiley for his encouragement and
assistance with the data; the UCLA Academic Senate for financial support; Laurie
Kuroyama for research assistance; and William Alford, Peter Arenella, Lynn
Baker, Lucian Bebchuk, Chi-Wo Cheng, John Haley, Lester Johnson, Kenneth
Karst, William Klein, Christine Littleton, Daniel Lowenstein, Bill McGeary, Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Ronald Oaxaca, Eric Rasmusen, Arthur Rosett, Gary Schwartz,
Murray Schwartz, Frank Upham, Norma Wyse, Eric Zolt, and the participants at a
UCLA School of Law Faculty Colloquium for their generous comments.
1. See infra, note 2.
2. Studies of gender and ethnic discrimination in the legal profession include,
for example, Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Women in Law (1981); Karen Berger Morello,
The Invisible Bar: The Woman Lawyer in America, 1638 to the Present (1986); Bar-
bara J. Burns, Areas of Practice Chosen by Women Law Graduates, Ill. B.J., May,
1986, at 434; Barbara A. Curran, American lawyers in the 1980s: A Profession in
Transition, 20 Law & Soc'y Rev. 19 (1986); Dorothy J. Glancy, Women in Law: The
Dependable Ones, 21 Harv. L. Sch. Bull. 23 (June 1970); John P. Heinz, Edward
Laumann, Charles Cappell, Terrence Halliday & Michael Schaalman, Diversity,
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Chicago Bar, 1976 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 717; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Women in
Law?: A Review of Cynthia Fuchs Epstein's Women in Law, 1983 Am. B. Found.
Res. J. 189; Rita J. Simon & Kathryn Gardner, Career Patterns Among University
of Illinois Women Law Graduates, 67 Women Law. J. 19 (1981); Rita J. Simon &
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this study, we attempt to measure that discrimination 3 against wo-
men and minorities, and to do so at the point of entry into the pro-
fession: the initial on-campus job interview with a law-firm.4
We also propose to study the impact of two other factors on
interviews: G.P.A. and law-review membership. According to the
professional lore, both matter critically. Consider the allure of the
review. Several years ago, Time magazine called the Harvard Law
Review members the "superachieving 8% in each class," and re-
ported that "[l]aw firms fight fiercely to pay them starting salaries
that top [the then-stratospheric figure of] $40,000."5 True, each
generation has had its nonconformists. Learned Hand joined the
Review but then quit, supposedly because he "did not come to law
school to edit a magazine";6 Thomas Eagleton quit as well, alleg-
edly because he found the Review "a great bore."7 But few have
had the nerve to make such choices. Instead, for decades the
Harvard Law Review and its peer institutions have maintained an
apparent stranglehold over law-student status. During that time,
however, most of these reviews chose their members primarily on
the basis of law-school grades.8 As a result, it was never clear that
Kathryn Gardner, Still the Second Sex, 10 Student Law. 18, 18 (Dec. 1981); Alexan-
der Stille, Outlook Better for Women, Asians: Little Room at the Top for Blacks,
Hispanics, Nat'l L. J., Dec. 23, 1985, at 1; Marilyn Tucker & Judith A. Lhamon, The
Hiring Scorecard, 12 Student Law. 23, 23 (Apr. 1984); James J. White, Women in
the Law, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1051 (1967); Bill Winter, Women Lawyers Work Harder,
Are Paid Less, But They're Happy, 69 A.B.A. J. 1384 (1983); Women Lawyers, 70
A.B.A. J. 33 (1984).
3. For purposes of this study, we define discrimination as a situation where a
law student at a job interview has (for whatever reason) a smaller chance of ob-
taining a call-back than other students with similar characteristics, including educa-
tional qualifications. We recognize that scholars have used a variety of other, often
much broader and more sophisticated, definitions. We use this definition not be-
cause we believe it better, but only because we find its narrow scope more tractable
for research purposes. For a discussion of various concepts of discrimination, see
generally Christine A. Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 1043 (1987).
4. We make no judgment about the value or usefulness of various types of em-
ployment. We limit ourselves to law-firm jobs only because those are the positions
that the students we investigated hoped to obtain.
Although we know which students eventually received job offers after partici-
pating in a second interview at the firm's home office, we have not counted the
number of students who accepted the call-back but interviewed unsuccessfully. We
counted only the students who succeeded at the home office interview. In other
words, we did not count the students who failed to obtain a job offer. As a result,
we generally confine ourselves to a discussion of the call-back offers rather than
the job offers.
5. La Creme de la Creme-Brulee, Time, Feb. 15, 1982, at 54.
6. Gerald Gunther, Memoirs, in Harvard Law Review Centennial Album 123,
124 (1987) [hereinafter cited as Centennial] (the possibly apocryphal Hand quota-
tion is part of the general lore of the legal profession).
7. Thomas F. Eagleton, Memoirs, id. at 30.
8. See Erwin N. Griswold, The Harvard Law Review--Glimpses of Its History
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review membership was not a redundant credential-it was never
clear how much its members owed their lucrative job offers to
their high grades and how much to the review itself.
We begin this essay by disentangling the effects of G.P.A. and
law review. Not surprisingly, we found that (1) high grades in-
creased a student's ability to obtain a second interview at the
firm's home office (a "call-back"), and (2) law-review membership
further enhanced a student's chance of a call-back. We also found,
however, (a) that the benefit of law-review membership fell as stu-
dent G.P.A. rose, and (b) that large firms cared more about G.P.A.
than review membership, while for small firms the opposite was
true. Second, we discuss the evidence on discrimination by ethnic-
ity. According to our data, minority students in the first three
G.P.A. quartiles found it harder to obtain a call-back than equally
qualified non-minority students. Unfortunately, we have evidence
from too few interviews to attribute any statistical significance to
this conclusion. Third, we turn to discrimination by gender. Our
evidence shows that: (1) both male and female interviewers pre-
ferred second-year female students to equally qualified male stu-
dents; (2) among low-G.P.A. students, male interviewers more
strongly preferred second-year female students than female inter-
viewers did; (3) low-G.P.A. second-year female students had a bet-
ter chance of obtaining a call-back if they interviewed with a man
than with a woman; and (4) the male preference for female stu-
dents was stronger among second-year students than among third-
year students.
Because of the politically sensitive nature of this study, we
emphasize its limitations at the outset. First, we investigated the
interviews at only one law school and during only one fall inter-
viewing season. We believe our results are representative, but we
have no proof of such. Second, we investigated only the initial on-
campus law-firm interview. We decline to predict how students
will fare later in their careers. Because second-year students con-
ducted many more interviews than third-year students, moreover,
we have focused primarily on second-year students. Third, by the
very nature of our data, we ignored many potentially relevant fac-
tors: for example, the status, rank, and age of the interviewers, the
areas of law in which the interviewers specialized, the courses that
the students took, or the poise, looks, age, and maturity of the stu-
dents. Fourth, our evidence does not prove why any event takes
place. Although we propose explanations, many readers will ad-
as Seen by an Aficionado, in Centennial, supra note 6, at 1, 6-16 (discussing
Harvard Law Review selection policies).
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vance their own. Last, we deliberately do not suggest how stu-
dents, law firms, or law schools should deal with the evidence we
present. Rather than debating the virtues of any policies we ad-
vance, we would prefer our readers to discuss the evidence itself.
I. The Study 9
The interviews we studied took place at the UCLA School of
Law. Although founded only four decades ago, the school has suc-
cessfully leapfrogged up the law school hierarchy. With its ad-
vance have risen the fortunes of its graduates. By the mid-1980s,
the school placed almost all its graduates in well-paying, law-re-
lated positions. According to the school's spring 1987 survey, most
of its third-year respondents had found jobs by the time they grad-
uated. They reported a modal salary of $52,000, and some students
claimed starting salaries reaching $70,000.
The interviewing process at UCLA works roughly as follows.
At the beginning of the fall semester, the students rank the law
firms with which they most want to interview. The placement of-
fice computer then assigns them interviews according to those
rankings in a manner that gives all students relatively equal num-
bers of interviews. In effect, the students use the rankings to com-
pete among themselves for on-campus interviews. The firms can
limit the number of students they will see, but cannot deny spe-
cific students interviews because of their resumes. After the on-
campus interviews, the law firms invite selected students to the
firm's office for a more extensive interview (the call-back). Stu-
dents who succeed at this call-back interview receive a job offer: a
summer associate position for second-year students (a summer in-
ternship), or a regular associate position for third-year students.
Second-year students generally find themselves evaluated again at
the the end of their internship-this time for a regular associate
position. Those who receive such an offer and who found their
summer internship satisfactory often do not interview elsewhere
during their third year.
We obtained our data from several sources. We collected in-
formation about student interviewing success from the law school's
interview schedules and the reports that the school required inter-
9. For a more technical discussion of the statistical measures used in this
study, see I.P.L. Png, David Eaves & J. Mark Ramseyer, Gender and
Discrimination: The Case of Law School Job Interviews, (unpublished manuscript,
1989, on file with Law & Inequality). For background to the empirical
methodology, see generally David A. Hensher & Lester W. Johnson, Applied
Discrete Choice Modelling (1981); Peter J. Bickel & Kjell A. Doksum,
Mathematical Statistics (1977); Henri Theil, Principles of Econometrics (1971).
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viewing firms to submit to its placement office. On these reports,
the firms listed the students to whom they offered call-backs and
the students to whom they eventually offered jobs. We obtained
information about (1) the number of lawyers and (2) the ratios of
female to male lawyers at the interviewing office of a firm and of
the minority to total lawyers (the firm gender ratio and ethnicity
ratio) from the National Association for Law Placement's law-firm
questionnaire, the placement office files, and the Martindale-Hub-
bell law directory. Because branch offices of large firms generally
hire their own lawyers, we treated each office as a separate firm.
We identified interviewer gender and ethnicity from the law-firm
interview schedules, the placement office files, and-when neces-
sary-the firms themselves. We gathered information about stu-
dent gender, ethnicity,10 and G.P.A. from the school registrar."1
Finally, we obtained information on law-review membership from
the law-review office. After compiling this data, we checked it for
completeness and accuracy against other available information.
We then eliminated incomplete or inaccurate records. This proce-
dure left us with a sample of 1,317 interviews held in the fall,
1986.12 They involved a total of 81 law firms and 229 second-year
(146 men, 83 women) and 133 third-year (77 men, 56 women) law
students.
Table 1 outlines the composition of the student body, and
shows the extent to which students participated in the on-campus
interviews. We note, in addition, that the law review has 85-95 stu-
dent members. It chooses most of these students by a writing com-
petition during the spring of the student's first year and some on
the basis of a publishable essay submitted later. At neither time
does it consider a candidate's G.P.A. During the fall, 1986, the law
review included 27 female members.
II. Grades and Law Review Membership
A. Introduction
Before examining the evidence on gender and ethnic discrim-
ination, consider which characteristics will most likely matter at
law-firm interviews. In particular, consider Table 2-a discrete-
10. This information is based on self-identification by the student.
11. In order to ensure the confidentiality of the G.P.A. data, a professor not in-
volved in this study coded the information before forwarding it to us.
12. Interviewers held a total of 5484 interviews at the school during the fall se-
mester. The sample consisted of an estimated 24% of the total population of inter-
views. Sample shrinkage can be attributed mainly to the failure of firms to submit
their reports to the school as required-probably out of a reluctance to complete
the somewhat time-consuming paperwork.
1989]
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choice logit model that included all the variables we thought might
affect the outcome of an interview.' 3 We expected that a high
G.P.A. and law-review membership would increase a student's
ability to obtain a call-back, that large firms would be more selec-
tive than small, and that firms that were located further from Los
Angeles would be more reluctant to call back students than com-
parable Los Angeles firms. We suspected that ethnicity and gen-
der might also influence the outcome of interviews, but were
uncertain of the direction in which they would do so.
The "asymptotic T-ratios" column in Table 2 measures the di-
rection and statistical significance of each variable. According to
these T-ratios, second-year students are most likely to obtain a
call-back if (1) they have high G.P.A.s, (2) they are female, (3)
they interview with non-L.A. firms, (4) they interview with small
firms, (5) they are members of the law review, and (6) they inter-
view with a non-minority interviewer.
For the sake of readers unfamiliar with statistical analysis,
we include a short explanation. If the T-ratio for a variable is neg-
ative, then an increase in the value of that variable correlates with
a smaller probability of a call-back; if the T-ratio is less than -1.96,
then that correlation is statistically significant. For example, the
variable for "office location" is 1 if a firm's office is in Los Angeles
County, and 0 if elsewhere. The value of the variable is thus high
for L.A. firms and low for non-L.A. firms. The variable's T-ratio
of -2.6664 indicates that an interview with an L.A. firm (the high
value of the variable) is less likely to result in a call-back than an
interview with a non-L.A. firm (the low value of the variable).
Likewise, "interviewer ethnicity" is 1 if a student interviewed
with a minority member, and 0 if he or she did not. The T-ratio of
-2.2293 indicates that an interview with a minority interviewer is
less likely to result in a call-back than an interview with a non-
minority. Finally, the T-ratio for "office size" is -2.5366: The
larger the office (the higher the variable), the less likely the call-
13. The explanatory variables are G.P.A., Student Gender, Office Location, Of-
fice Size, Law-Review Membership, Interviewer Ethnicity, Interviewer Gender, Of-
fice Gender-Ratio, Student Ethnicity, and Office Ethnicity-Ratio. Data from mixed
gender interviewer teams were excluded. All explanatory variables were tested for
significance of explanatory power.
The specific model employed was the discrete-choice logit model, in which it is
postulated that:
Prob Icall backj - 1 / (1 + e-' * B)
where
X * B = a0 + aGPA + a2STUDGDR + a3OFFLOC + a4OFFSIZE +
aREVIEW + a6INTETH + a7INTGDR + a8OFFGRAT + aSTUDETH +
aoOFFERAT.







Variables Estimates Standard Errors T-ratios
G.P.A. .21730* .025576 '8.4960
Student gender (0=male) .54613* .19243 2.8380
Office location
(0=not L.A. county) -. 58659* .21999 -2.6664
Office size -. 0059969* .0023642 -2.5366
Review (0= non-member) .65405* .26241 2.4924
Interviewer ethnicity
(0=non-minority) -1.8241* .81824 -2.2293
Interviewer gender
(0=male) .24188 .21959 1.1015
Office gender ratio -1.1409 1.1310 -1.0087
Student ethnicity
(0=non-minority) - .24672 .35216 - .70060
Office ethnicity ratio -. 73770 1.4914 -. 49464
Constant -17.987* 2.0087 -8.9543
Likelihood ratio test: 124.841 with 10 degrees of freedom.
Log-likelihood function = -369.9790.
*Significant at the 95% level.
B. Third Year
Asymptotic Asymptotic
Variables Estimates Standard Errors T-ratios
G.P.A. .16687* .050250 3.3207
Student gender (O=male) .32621 .30542 1.0681
Office location
(0=not L.A. county) .42269 .32300 -1.3083
Office size -. 0017620 .0034005 -. 51818
Review (0=non-member) .93900* .33640 2.7913
Interviewer gender
(0 = male) -1.1326* .39064 -2.8994
Office gender ratio -. 87559 1.6836 -. 52006
Student ethnicity
(0=non-minority) - .43152 .51676 - .83504
Office ethnicity ratio -9.0333* 3.7745 -2.3933
Constant -14.188* 4.0640 -3.4910
Likelihood ratio test: 42.1842 with 9 degrees of freedom.
Log-likelihood function = -155.7746.
Interviewer ethnicity omitted because of instability (standard error = 267,350).
*Significant at the 95% level.
back. Because in each case the T-ratio is less than -1.96, each of
these results is statistically significant.
Conversely, if the T-ratio for a variable is positive, an in-
crease in the value of that variable correlates with a greater
probability of a call-back; if the T-ratio is larger than 1.96, the cor-
[Vol. 7:189
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relation is statistically significant. Note that the T-ratios for
G.P.A., student gender (1 if female, 0 if male), and law review (1 if
member, 0 if not) are all greater than 1.96. Table 2 thus shows
that students are significantly more likely to obtain a call-back if
they have a high G.P.A., are female, and are law-review members.
The reader should bear in mind two qualifications. First,
most of the third-year data is statistically less significant than the
second-year data. For each of the variables discussed above, how-
ever, the direction of the effect is nonetheless the same. Second,
Table 2 suggests no significant conclusions at the second-year level
about interviewer gender, office gender and ethnicity ratios, or stu-
dent ethnicity.
We devote this attention to Table 2 because it tests the im-
pact of the variables exactly. In measuring the effect of each vari-
able, Table 2 holds constant the effect of all others. As a result, it
measures precisely each variable's "stand-alone" effect. Neverthe-
less, because Table 2 is also somewhat difficult to understand, we
discuss in Sections II and III the effect these variables have in a
less precise but (we hope) intuitively clearer fashion. In Section
IV, we turn to the effect that some of these variables (e.g., inter-
viewer gender) have when they interact with others (e.g., student
gender).
B. Grade-Point Average
Table 3 more dramatically illustrates exactly how G.P.A. af-
fects a student's success rate.14 Second-year students in the first
quartile obtained call-backs at almost every other interview, a suc-
cess rate of .430, while those in the fourth quartile obtained one
call-back in every fifteen interviews, a success rate of .069. From
the fourth quartile to the first, an increase in the interviewing suc-
cess rate accompanied each step increase in G.P.A. If--as seems
reasonable-high-G.P.A. students interview with more selective
firms than low-G.P.A. students, Table 3 may understate the impor-
tance of one's G.P.A.
C. Law-Review Membership
Law-review work can demand significant amounts of time.
Students have complained about this work for decades, of course,
14. By success rate, we refer only to the probability of obtaining a call back at a
given law-firm interview.
According to the test used for Table 2, the impact of G.P.A. on interviewing





G.P.A. and Probability of Success
Second & third
GPA quartile Second' year Third year combined
First .430" .318 .419
Second .238 .231 .272
Third .122 .190 .155
Fourth .069 .030 .056
All students .205 .186 .223
Whenever comparisons are made between second- and third-year students in this
study, the comparison is between two different sets of students and is not a
longitudinal study of the same students over time.
b Ratio of number of calls-back to number of interviews.
and argued that it significantly hampered their class work. When
asked to reminisce, one former editor of the Harvard Law Review
spoke for many alumni and alumnae when he answered simply: "I
am afraid that I have repressed it all."15 Yet no one has ever actu-
ally shown that this work hurts academic performance. If student
rumors about the effect of review work on G.P.A. were true, how-
ever, then the marginal contribution of law-review membership
(the interviewing benefit of membership after adjusting for
G.P.A.) would become critical. Table 4 therefore explores this con-
tribution.
Consistent with student rumors, law-review members do in-
terview more successfully than other students. Second-year re-
view members obtained a call-back in 42.5 percent of their
interviews, while non-members obtained call-backs in only 23.7
percent of theirs.16 Furthermore, review membership benefits stu-
dents independently of their G.P.A.-though the benefit to high-
G.P.A. students is rather modest. According to Table 4, a second-
year student in the third quartile could more than double his or
her interviewing success rate (from 12.6 percent to 28.0 percent) by
joining the review. A first quartile student, however, could in-
crease his or her success rate by only one fourth (from 46.9 per-
cent to 59.4 percent).17 In short, the benefit of review membership
declined as a student's G.P.A. increased. In schools where the re-
15. Anonymous, Memoirs, in Centennial, supra note 6, at 21, 21.
16. According to the test used for Table 2, the impact of review membership on
interviewing success is statistically significant at the 95% level for both second- and
third-year students.
17. The difference in the beneficial effect of review membership for second-
year students in the first and third quartiles is statistically significant at more than
the 90% level.
[Vol. 7:189
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TABLE 4
Law Review Membership and Probability of Success
(Second Year)
GPA quartile A. Review B. Non-review A/B
First .594 .469 1.27
Second .373 .245 1.52
Third .280 .126 2.22
Fourth N.A., .117 N.A.
All students .425 .237 1.79
No review members had G.P.A.s in this quartile.
view chooses its members solely by G.P.A., review membership
would convey little additional information. As a result, one would
expect the review there to have even less effect on its members'
interviewing success.
If review membership did decrease G.P.A., then Table 4
would also show the possible opportunity costs of that member-
ship. Take, for example, students in the second quartile. If they
joined the review and maintained their grades, they would in-
crease their success rate from 24.5 percent to 37.3 percent. If the
time spent on review work would otherwise have raised their
G.P.A. one quartile, then in terms of interviewing success the bar-
gain was not worth it-for an increase in G.P.A. would have raised
their success rate to 46.9 percent. On the other hand, for third-
quartile students the reverse would have been true-review mem-
bership would have increased their success rate from 12.6 percent
to 28.0 percent, while a one-quartile G.P.A. rise would have in-
creased it only to 24.5 percent.18
In fact, however, student concern over the effect of law-re-
view work on G.P.A. may be entirely misplaced: Our data do not
show that review work lowers G.P.A. On the contrary, over the
course of 1986-87, the mean G.P.A. of second-year law-review
members actually increased slightly, while that of non-review sec-
ond-year students decreased. Because the difference in the G.P.A.
18. Employers might make an analogous, off-setting calculation by assuming
that a law-review member's G.P.A. (after that student has been on the review for
more than a semester) understates his or her real abilities. Were employers to
make such an off-setting adjustment, a sophisticated student would not ask the
questions posed in the text. Instead, the student would ask whether his or her
G.P.A. was likely to fall more than the average amount as a result of his or her
joining the review. We do not know how often employers make such an adjust-
ment. As noted below, however, our evidence indicates that student G.P.A.s typi-
cally do not decrease after they join the review.
1989]
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change for the two groups is not statistically significant, one can-
not claim that review membership raises G.P.A. Neither, however,
can one claim that it lowers it.
D. Firm-Size and the Importance of G.P.A. and Review
Observers persistently claim that large firms care more about
G.P.A. and review membership than small firms. They advance a
variety of reasons: For example, large-firm associates write more
memoranda and thus find more helpful the skills the review
teaches; the clients of large firms attach more importance to tradi-
tional indices of ability than small-firm clients; and small-firm as-
sociates are more likely to need skills other than the ability to
write and take tests. Consider, therefore, Table 5.
TABLE 5
Office Size, G.P.A., and Law Review Membership
(Second Year)
Probability of Success Probability of Success
A. Large B. Small A. Large B. Small
G.P.A. firms firms A/B firms firms A/B
quartile (>291) (<29)
First .563 .467 1.21 Review .338 .600 .56
member
Second .285 .349 .82
Third .104 .252 .41 Non-review .262 .242 1.08
members
Fourth .052 .085 .61
All All
students .271 .271 1.00 students .271 .271 1.00
Median size of law offices that interviewed second-year students.
This table suggests that the hypothesis above is true about
G.P.A. but not about law review. Large firms do care about
grades. Students in the first quartile have a better chance of ob-
taining a call-back at a large firm than a small firm (56.3 percent
at a large firm compared with 46.7 percent at a small firm). Stu-
dents in the last three quartiles encounter the opposite phenome-
non: They have a better chance of a call-back at a small firm than
a large (8.5 percent at a small firm compared with 5.2 percent at a
large firm for fourth-quartile students).19 By contrast, large firms
19. The reader, however, should consider that (1) when high-G.P.A. students
[Vol. 7:189
GENDER, ETHNICITY AND GRADES
seem less concerned about law-review membership. Review mem-
bers have a better chance of a call-back at a small firm (60.0 per-
cent) than a large firm (33.8 percent), while students not on the
review do slightly better at large firms (26.2 percent) than small
firms (24.2 percent). To put the same point differently, review
membership gives a 2.48 times advantage at small firms (.600/.242
= 2.48), but only a 1.29 times advantage at large firms (.338/.262 -
1.29).20
In other words, the data suggest (though do not prove)2 1 a hy-
pothesis contrary to the folk wisdom: Small firms value visible
credentials like review membership (since former review members
can prominently display their bound volumes and plaques in their
offices), while large firms value indices of ability like grades that
after graduation few people will notice (unless the students earn
honors or coif membership). Large firms may not need the extra
credentials students bring, in short, yet may nonetheless consider
grades a good predictor of graduate performance.
III. The Effect of Minority Status
Law-firm interviewers do seem to discriminate against minor-
ity students in the first three G.P.A. quartiles. According to Table
6, these students had a smaller chance of obtaining a call-back
than their non-minority peers: even top-G.P.A. minority students
had lower success rates than non-minority students, and third-
quartile minority students had less than half the success rate of
non-minority students. Only those in the fourth quartile had at
least the success rate of their non-minority peers.
Unfortunately, our sample included too few minority student
interviews to attach any statistical significance to these results.
Our sample contained only 207 minority student interviews, and
those interviews resulted in only 21 call-backs. We would have
preferred to ask several other questions: for example, do minority
interview with small firms, they may interview at highly selective "boutique" firms,
and (2) at the third-year level, students have higher success rates at the smaller
firms in all quartiles.
20. At the third-year level, both review and non-review members have higher
success rates at smaller firms. Nevertheless, review membership still provides a
greater advantage at the smaller firms (1.52) than at the large (1.14).
21. One could advance a variety of other hypotheses equally consistent with
this data. For example, small firms may know that large firms value G.P.A. more
than law-review membership and assume that high-G.P.A. students will eventually
accept job offers from the higher-paying large firms. Rather than use resources to
interview students who would not accept their offers in any event, they call back
students with lower G.P.A.s. Among those lower-G.P.A. students, they concentrate




Ethnic Status and Probability of Success
(Both Yearsa)
GPA quartile A. Non-Minority B. Minority C. A/B
First .433 .400 1.08
Second .255 .250 1.02
Third .158 0.65 2.43
Fourth .049 0.68 0.72
All students .246 .101 2.43
a Second and third years aggregated because of small numbers
students interview more successfully at large firms or small; do
minority students interview with the same sized firms as their
non-minority peers; does the treatment of minority students
change from the second year to the third; within the minority stu-
dent population are members of some ethnic groups more success-
ful at obtaining call-backs than others; and do interviewers treat
minority women differently than minority men? Once again, how-
ever, the small number of minority students in our sample pre-
vented us from reaching meaningful conclusions on these issues.
IV. The Effect of Gender
A. The Preference for Women
Of the factors tested in Table 2, the one after G.P.A. that
most clearly affects second-year interviewing success is the stu-
dent's gender. The asymptotic T-ratio of 2.8380 for student gender
indicates a statistically significant preference for women. Contrary
to much mythology about the initial interview, law firms appar-
ently prefer equally qualified women to men.2 2 The statistics are
22. This predilection occurs despite under-representation of women on the re-
view. This raises questions about (1) the finding in Glancy, supra note 2, at 24, that
women law students received fewer job offers per given number of interviews than
men, and (2) general psychological studies showing that interviews result in dis-
crimination against women. See, e.g., Robert L. Dipboye, Richard Arvey, & David
Terpstra, Equal Employment and the Interview, 55 Personnel J. 520 (1976); Robert
L. Dipboye & Jack Wiley, Reactions of College Recruiters to Interviewee Sex and
Self-Presentation Style, 10 J. Vocational Behav. 1 (1977). Furthermore, our findings
suggest that where interviews are involved, studies based solely on evaluations of
male and female resumes or publications may have only limited relevance. See,
e.g., Richard D. Arvey, Unfair Discrimination in the Employment Interview, 86
Psychological Bull. 736, 746-56 (1979); Virginia E. O'Leary & Ranald D. Hasen, Try-
ing Hurts Women, Helps Men: The Meaning of Effor in Women in the Work
Force 100 (H. John Bernardin ed. 1982).
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straightforward: among second-year students, men received call-
backs at 20.3 percent of their interviews, while women received
them at 26.9 percent. Furthermore, this law-firm preference for
women seems (however tentative our data may be)23 to continue at
the home-office interview itself: the firms offered jobs to 53.9 per-
cent of the women given call-backs, but to only 48.0 percent of the
men.
24
This law-firm preference for women does not reflect
observable differences in academic qualifications. The men
and women in our sample had comparable educational records (a
median male G.P.A. of 78.8 and a female median of 79.1).25 And in
any event, interviewers preferred women at almost every G.P.A.
quartile:
TABLE 7
Student Gender and Probability of Success
A. Second Year
GPA quartile A. Male B. Female C. A/B
First .416 .571 .73
Second .236 .262 .90
Third .079 .205 .39
Fourth .054 .138 .39
B. Third Year
GPA quartile A. Male B. Female C. A/B
First .333 .333 1.00
Second .240 .353 .68
Third .204 .184 1.11
Fourth .023 .034 .68
Readers Will have their own reasons for this phenomenon,
but we offer three possibilities: maturity, a male preference for fe-
male students, and choice of firm. First, women may exhibit
greater maturity, poise, or other attributes not captured by our
data. In fact, given the overwhelmingly male character of the bar,
interviewers may believe female students are less likely to have
23. We have not counted the number of students offered call-backs who actu-
ally visited the firm's home office. Thus, these percentages could reflect a higher
rate of accepting call-backs among women.
24. This figure represents jobs offered to second-year students. Among all stu-
dents, the figures were 52.3% and 45.2%.
25. This median applies to second-year students. Among the third-year stu-
dents in our sample, the median G.P.A. for men was 78.9, and the median G.P.A.
for women was 78.8.
1989]
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"fallen into" law school and more likely to be enthusiastic about
practicing law. Second, for whatever reason,26 male interviewers
may prefer to hire women. Since male lawyers hold the majority
of the interviews at the school, any such preference would give an
interviewing advantage to female students. Third, perhaps because
they fear discrimination, women may systematically interview at
firms that either are less selective or are known to be particularly
partial to women. Our data do not enable us to test the first hy-
pothesis, but do offer some evidence on the second and third
hypotheses.
B. The Male Preference for Women
1. Evidence of the Preference
In order to test the possibility of a male preference for wo-
men, we compared the call-backs offered by male and female in-
terviewers. The results confirm the existence of such a
preference: both male and female interviewers preferred second-
year female students to male, but male interviewers preferred wo-
men by a wider margin than did female interviewers. 27 Male in-
terviewers offered call-backs to only 18.3 percent of the men, but
to 25.2 percent of the women. Female interviewers offered call-
backs to about the same percentage of the women (25.3 percent)
but to only 21.3 percent of the men. Both male and female inter-
viewers favored women to men, in other words, but male inter-
viewers favored them more strongly.
2. The Male Preference and Low G.P.A. Students
This male preference for female students becomes more pro-
nounced the lower a student's G.P.A. is. Thus, turn to the success
rates for second-year students with below-median G.P.A.s: Table 9
shows that the male preference for women becomes clearer as
G.P.A. falls.28 Among below-median students, male interviewers
26. Various possibilities are explored below at text accompanying notes 31-33,
infra.
27. The logit model used in Table 2 does not test for interaction effects among
the variables. Hence, in the following analysis we present tests of statistical signifi-
cance as well.
These tests are based on an assumption that the number of interviews is large
enough that sample probabilities have approximately normal distribution.
Png, Eaves & Ramseyer, supra note 9, at Table 1, presents the results of a logit
model in which the gender variables were allowed to interact with each other. The
results indicate that the interaction between male interviewers and female students
has an effect on the outcome of interviews that is statistically significant at the 95%
level.
28. According to the "comparison of means" test used in Table 9, the difference
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TABLE 8
Probability of Success and Gender
(Second Year)
Student
M F Dif.°  Norm.
No. interviews' 383 218
Called Backb 70 55
M p call back' .183 .252 -. 069 -1.96
Var (p)d .00039 .00085 .00124
No. interviews 150 83
Called back 32 21
Interviewer F p call-back .213 .253 - .040 -0.68
Var (p) .00112 .00228 .00340
No. interviews 58 30
Called back 18 13
B9 p call-back .310 .433 -. 123 -1.13
Var (p) .00369 .00818 .00119
0 Number of interviews (n) in sample.
b Number of calls-back (x) offered.
c Probability of call back (p = x/n).
d Variance of probability (Si2 = [pi][1 -pi/ni).
e Difference between call-back probabilities for male and female students
(p. - p).
'Normalization of difference ([p. - pf]/d/S ' +W).
9 Interviewing teams including both genders.
preferred women by a difference of .120. Female interviewers pre-
ferred women by only .031. Male interviewers, it seems, preferred
women over men nearly four times as strongly as did female inter-
viewers. Furthermore, this male preference gives a tactical advan-
tage to those women who interview with a male lawyer. A female
student had an 18.5 percent chance of a call-back with a male in-
terviewer, but only an 11.1 percent chance with a female
interviewer.
3. The Male Preference and Firm Size
Table 10 shows that male interviewers from small firms favor
between the preference by male and female interviewers for female students is,
among below-median-G.P.A. students, statistically significant at nearly the 90%
level. Png, Eaves & Ramseyer, supra note 9, at Table 1, however, presents a logit
model in which the gender variables were allowed to interact with each other, with
the statistically significant effect described in note 27, supra. When student G.P.A.
is also allowed to interact with the gender variables, the logit model indicates
(again, at the 95% confidence level) that as student G.P.A. falls, the effect of cross-
gender interaction increases. See Png, Eaves & Ramseyer, supra note 9, at Table 2.
Law and Inequality
TABLE 9
Probability of Success and Gender
(Below Median GPA Second Years Students)
Student
M F Dif. Norm.
Number 185 108
Male Called back 12 20
Interviewer p call-back .065 .185 -0.120 -2.90
Var (p) .00033 .00840 .00173
Number 75 45
Called back 6 5
Female p call-back .080 .111 -. 031 -0.55
Var (p) .00098 .00219 .00317
second-year women more strongly than their peers at the large
firms favor them.29 According to the table, male interviewers
from large firms favored women by a difference of .022, while
those from small firms favored them by .178. Men from small
firms, in short, favored women at over eight times the rate by
which men from large firms favored them.30
4. Reasons for the Preference
Our data do not, of course, prove why male interviewers pre-
fer women students. Readers may have their own theories; we
note the following possibilities. First, many interviews between
men and women may produce an intangible heterosexual attrac-
tion.3 1 This hypothesis is consistent with the fact that the prefer-
29. Curiously, much of the conventional literature has documented a tendency
for many women to work at very large firms. See, e.g., Barbara A. Curran, Kathe-
rine J. Rosich, Clara N. Carson & Mark C. Puccetti, Supplement to the Lawyer Sta-
tistical Report: The U.S. Legal Profession in 1985, at 4 (1986); Curran, supra note 2,
at 42-49; Stille, supra note 2, at 6; Tucker & Lhamon, supra note 2, at 24; White,
supra note 2, at 1058-60.
30. This difference in the male preference for women between large-firm inter-
viewers and small-firm interviewers is statistically significant at above the 95%
level.
Although some collinearity between firm size and firm gender ratio did exist, it
was not significant. Thus, the greater male preference for female students in the
smaller firms cannot be attributed to any relation between firm gender ratio and
the male preference for women (see Table 11).
31. If women are indeed being hired in part because of sexual attraction, the
consequences of that fact for their later careers is unclear. It could result in their
not being taken seriously as lawyers or being subject to sexual harassment. It could
also, however, simply reflect how much people enjoy talking and working with peo-
ple of the other gender.
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TABLE 10
Probability of Success with Male Interviewer by Office Size
(Second Year)
Student
M F Dif. Norm.
No. interviews 268 151
Large Called back 51 32
firms p call-back .190 .212 -.022 -. 53
Var (p) .00057 .00111 .00168
No. interviews 115 67
Small Called back 19 23
firms p call-back .165 .343 - .178 -2.64
Var (p) .00120 .00336 .00456
ence is most noticeable (1) at interviews involving low-G.P.A.
students (Table 9), and (2) among the interviewers from the
smaller firms (Table 10). After all, one would most expect to no-
tice the effect of any sexual attraction at those interviews where
the student was least likely otherwise to obtain a call-back (among
the low-G.P.A. students), or where the interviewer had the great-
est hiring discretion and greatest opportunity later to meet the stu-
dent (at the smaller firms). Second, men may feel guilty about the
way their firms (or the legal profession generally) have treated
women. Consequently, they may favor female students to atone
for that treatment. Third, men may believe female students will
bring different values to the firm, and hope that by hiring more
women they can create a less stressful environment. 32 Fourth,
men may fear sex-discrimination lawsuits more than do women.
To protect their firm against such litigation, they may try to in-
crease the percentage of women at the firm. Fifth, men may have
more confidence in their ability to evaluate male students than fe-
male students. As a result, they may believe they can spot unsatis-
factory men without calling them back to the firm, but have less
such assurance about women. Unfortunately, our data do not en-
able us to distinguish among these hypotheses.
Some of our colleagues suggested that our data may show less
an attraction between male lawyers and women than a reluctance
by female lawyers to offer call-backs to other women. First, fe-
male lawyers may fear that other lawyers will label them "femi-
32. For a careful discussion of the possibility that women bring different values
to the profession, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Specula-
tions on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 Berkeley Women's L.J. 39 (1985).
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nist" unless they reject women more often than male interviewers.
Second, many female lawyers may believe their firms have treated
them unfairly. In order to spare younger women the mistreatment
they experienced, they may hesitate to call back female students.
Third, to the extent a firm segregates women and keeps them
outside its mainstream, women may compete among themselves
for the few available "female" jobs at the firm. Female lawyers
may thus see female students less as future colleagues then as
competitors. 33
To explore this second set of hypotheses, we considered the
effect of firm gender ratio (the ratio of women to men at the firm)
on call-back rates. According to Table 11, men at the lower gen-
der-ratio firms (firms with lower percentages of women) favored
second-year women by a difference of .094, while men at the
higher gender-ratio firms favored women by only .038. By con-
trast, women at the lower gender-ratio firms treated men and wo-
men alike, while women at the higher gender-ratio firms favored
women by .103.34 The male preference for women thus fell with
an increase in the gender-ratio, while the female preference for
women rose.
This evidence casts doubt on the notion that competition
among women might explain the results in Tables 8 and 9. First,
in neither high- nor low-gender-ratio firms did women discrimi-
nate against women. Were intra-gender competition a factor, one
would expect female interviewers to treat female students more
harshly than male students. In neither group did that phenome-
non occur. Second, the greater the percentage of women at a firm,
the more the women at that firm seemed to favor female students.
A straightforward theory of competition would suggest the
contrary.
33. Alternatively, some female lawyers may believe that their law firm-how-
ever much it promises them benefits like maternity leave-will only carry out
those promises if the demand for the benefits remains low. In order to insure that
such benefits remain available, therefore, these women may try to restrict the
number of other lawyers (i.e., other women) who will demand them. Still other
female lawyers may plan to use such benefits themselves but believe that their
male peers respect women who do not demand such benefits more highly than
those who do. In order to prevent unfavorable comparisons with women who will
not use the benefits, these women may deny call-backs to women they think will
not demand them.
34. This analysis should be considered more skeptically than the analysis else-
where in this paper. The difference between (a) the different male treatment of
students by gender at high- and low-gender-ratio firms and (b) the different female
treatment of students by gender at high-and low-gender-ratio firms is statistically
significant at only the 85% level. Furthermore, the third-year interviews present a
very different story. See note 42, infra.
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TABLE 11
Interviews by Office Gender Ratio
(Second Year)
Student
M F Dif. Norm.
No. interviews 227 111
Low M Called back 38 29
gender p call-back .167 .261 -. 094 -1.94
ratio Interviewer Var (p) .00061 .00174 .00235
firms
(<.22') No. interviews 95 50
F Called back 21 11
p call-back .221 .220 .001 0.01
Var (p) .00181 .00343 .00524
No. interviews 156 107
High M Called back 32 26
gender p call-back .205 .243 -. 038 -0.72
ratio Interviewer Var (p) .00105 .00172 .00276
firms
(> .22) No. interviews 55 33
F Called back 11 10
p call-back .200 .303 -. 103 -1.07
Var (p) .00291 .00640 .00931
Median gender ratio of firms in sample.
At the same time, the evidence supports (however ambigu-
ously) the notion that some women may reject female students
either because they fear the "feminist" label or because they be-
lieve their firms treat women badly. Suppose--and we think it
reasonable-that high-gender-ratio firms have more effectively in-
tegrated women into their firms than the low-gender-ratio firms.3 5
If true, one would expect women at the low-gender-ratio firms
both to be more worried about a "feminist" label and to have more
misgivings about bringing young women into the firm.3 6 Table 11
indicates that these dynamics could be at work.
The evidence also suggests that some male interviewers may
be hiring women with a quota in mind. Male interviewers from
firms with low percentages of women favor women over men by
35. On the possible consequences of "tokenism" at the low-gender-ratio firms,
see Rosabath Moss Kanter, Reflections on Women and the Legal Professsion " A So-
ciological Perspective, 1 Harv. Women's L. J. 1 (1978).
36. Alternatively, women at the firms that treat women poorly might want to
recruit more women. They might reason that increasing the number of women at
their firm would give them the "critical mass" necessary to bring about changes.
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over 50 percent, giving male students a .167 success rate, but fe-
male students a .261 rate; male interviewers from firms with
higher concentrations of women favor women by less than 20 per-
cent, giving male students a .205 success rate, but female students
a .243 success rate. Perhaps the men from low-gender-ratio firms
hope to atone for past discrimination against women at their firms,
or perhaps they hope to forestall lawsuits alleging sex discrimina-
tion. For whatever the reason, they favor women more strongly
than the male interviewers from the high-gender-ratio firms.
C. Student Gender and Firm Selection
As noted earlier, the general interviewing advantage among
women might also result from a difference in the firms at which
men and women choose to interview. For example, because they
fear discrimination, women may interview with less selective firms
or with firms that maintain a reputation for strongly favoring wo-
men. Although this would not explain why male and female law-
yers respond differently to male and female students, it might help
explain the generally higher success rates among women. Again,
our data contain no direct measures of a firm's selectivity or sensi-
tivity toward the concerns of women. Yet, they do permit us to
test the size and gender-ratio of the firms with which men and wo-
men decide to interview.
Because large firms tend to be more selective than small
firms (see Table 2), any tendency among women to interview with
smaller firms might help explain their higher success rates. Un-
fortunately, the explanation does not work. Men and women in-
terview with large firms at approximately the same overall rates.
Of the interviews involving male students, 66.1 percent took place
with large firms; of those involving female students, 70.2 percent
involved large firms.3 7
Likewise, if women tended to interview with firms known to
be partial to women, that tendency might explain their greater in-
terviewing success. Thus, if (1) firm gender-ratio correlated with
any such partiality, and (2) women interviewed heavily with high-
gender-ratio firms, those facts might account for their high success
rates. This explanation works no better than the other, for the
over-all difference in success rates for women at high-and-low-gen-
der-ratio firms is small: women have a 23.6 percent success rate at
the former, and a 22.7 percent rate at the latter.38
37. These figures include all interviews, regardless of interviewer gender or
school year of student.
38. All interviews were counted regardless of interviewer gender or school year
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D. Evidence of Discrimination-Return Rates and
Summer Programs
Women fare better than men at the on-campus interviews.
Some readers will find this reassuring; others will find it troub-
ling-but the phenomenon itself is clear. Other aspects of our
data, however, show that law firms may not yet be quite as hospi-
table to women as this statement might suggest. Consider the ea-
gerness of third-year women with low G.P.A.s to return to the
interview pool and the differing success rates of second- and third-
year students.39
1. Third-Year Return Rates
We may not know directly what success third-year students
had during their summer internship, but we do have indirect evi-
dence on point: whether students interview for jobs during their
third year. Students who had a successful summer job will less
likely interview during their third year than those whose intern-
ship was unsatisfactory. According to Table 12, though, among stu-
dents with below-median G.P.A.s, a significantly larger portion of
the women interviewed as third-year students than the men.40
During the second-year, a larger fraction of men with below-me-
dian G.P.A.s (.685) participated in the interviews than women
(.526); by the third-year, a greater fraction of women (.538) partici-
pated than men (.459). This phenomenon does not occur among
students as a whole. Although second-year men are more likely to
interview than second-year women (a participation rate of 78.1
percent for men compared to 74.8 percent for women), the same
holds true at the third-year level (a 48.7 percent male participation
rate compared to a 46.7 percent female rate).
This result may suggest (once again, it certainly does not
prove) that law firms discriminate against female summer interns.
First, the firms may offer permanent jobs to smaller percentages
of the women than the men. Even if law firms offer summer jobs
to the higher achieving women, they may pick men among the
lower achieving students. Second, the firms may discriminate
against women in more subtle ways. And in this sense, our data
of student. Note that the effect of firm gender-ratio varies greatly depending on
whether second- or third-year students are interviewing. For the effect of firm gen-
der-ratio on interviewing success during the second year, see Table 11, supra; for
the effect during the third year, see note 42, infra.
39. We are comparing two different student populations and are not conducting
a longitudinal study of interviewing success over time.
40. The difference between the male and female participation rates among the




Participation in Interview Pool
(Below-median-G.P.A. Students)
Student
M F Dif. Norm.
No. interviewees' 63 30
Second No. students 92 57
year p participation .685 .526 .159 1.94
Var (p) .00235 .00437 .00672
No. interviewees 34 35
Third No. students 74 65
year p participation .459 .538 -. 079 -0.93
Var (p) .00336 .00382 .00718
In sample population, not total student body.
provide more information than any direct evidence about which
firms made offers to which summer interns. Even if a law firm
even-handedly extends offers, after all, it may make women suffi-
ciently uncomfortable that they do not want to return. Any study
that looked only at the distribution of offers would miss such prej-
udice. Our data-by testing the rate by which third-year students
return to the interview pool--captures a richer phenomenon: the
dissatisfaction that a large portion of the third-year female stu-
dents feel about the firms at which they interned.
2. Summer Programs
The differing call-back rates for second- and third-year stu-
dents also suggest a possible law-firm bias against women. Con-
sider Table 13: male interviewers did strongly prefer second-year
women to men (giving women a 25.2 percent success rate com-
pared to 18.3 percent for men), but they treated third-year men
and women almost identically. At least two reasons for this phe-
nomenon suggest themselves, but neither augurs entiely well for
women. First, male lawyers may care more about having a steady
corps of young women at the firm during the summer than in inte-
grating women into the firm's permanent staff.41 They may hire
women, in other words, more to enliven the summer program than
41. Anyone inclined to dismiss this suggestion as preposterous should recall the
King & Spaulding 1983 summer outing. This premier Atlanta law firm-home to
Charles Kirbo and Griffin Bell-had planned to have its female summer interns
compete in a wet T-shirt contest. When "cooler heads prevailed," as the Wall
Street Journal put it, the firm substituted swimsuits for wet T-shirts and proceeded
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because they see a permanent place for women at the firm. Sec-
ond, some hiring committees see the second-year summer program
as a chance to test "high-risk" recruits. If many men do still ques-
tion the place of female lawyers at their law firms, they may see
women as "high-risk." To the extent they do so, the male prefer-
ence for women will decrease from the second year to the third.42
TABLE 13
Probability of Success with Male Interviewer by School year
Student
M F Dif. Norm.
Number 383 218
Second Called back 70 55
year p call-back .183 .252 -. 069 -1.53
Var (p) .00039 .00085 .00124
Number 143 107
Third Called back 36 28
year p call-back .252 .262 -. 010 -0.17
Var (p) .00132 .00181 .00312
V. Conclusions
Grades matter and review matters: students with high grades
and law-review editors find it easier to obtain call-backs than
others. That much we suspected. But we also discovered that the
alleged importance of the review duplicates in part the importance
of G.P.A., and that large firms value G.P.A. more than review
membership while small firms care more about review. Further-
more, gender and race may also matter and may cut in directions
that will surprise many readers. Although we conducted too few
interviews to reach a statistically significant conclusion about
ethnicity, our data tentatively suggest that on-campus interviewers
may avoid minorities in the first three G.P.A. quartiles. By con-
trast, particularly during the second year, interviewers definitely
favor women.
Readers should take care not to exaggerate the importance of
these findings. As noted at the outset, we studied only one school
with the contest. James B. Stewart, Are Women Lawyers Discriminated Against
at Large Law Firms, Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 1983, at 1.
42. We identified two contexts in which third-year women actually have lower
success rates in interviewing than men. First, third-year women have a 16.9% suc-
cess rate whereas men have a 21.7% rate with large firms. Second, third-year wo-
men have a 20.8% success rate whereas men have a 30.6% success rate at low-
gender-ratio firms.
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and only one interviewing season. Although we believe our results
representative, we certainly have no proof. Furthermore, we pri-
marily studied only the probability of a second-year student's ob-
taining a call-back from an on-campus interview. Third-year
interviews differ in a variety of ways, and life after graduation dif-
fers even more. At this initial point of entry into the profession,
however, the following seems clear: ethnicity may matter; grades,
review membership, and gender definitely matter. Firms may
avoid minority students; they definitely favor high-G.P.A. stu-
dents, law-review members, and women.
